Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Communication models: A communication model illustrates the process of information exchange between sender and receiver. It typically includes components like encoding (sender's creation of a message), transmission (conveyance through a channel), decoding (receiver's interpretation), and feedback (response influencing subsequent communication). Models like Shannon-Weaver or Berlo's S-M-C-R depict elements and flow of communication interactions, aiding in understanding communication dynamics. See also Broadcasting model, Network model._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Economic Theories on Communication Models - Dictionary of Arguments
Kranton I 423 Communication Models/Bloch/Demange/Kranton/Economic Theories: (…) the model [by Bloch, Demange and Kranton] combines two classic elements of information games: “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982)(1) in the decision of the initial receiver of the signal as to whether or not to create a truthful message, and “persuasion” (Milgrom, 1981(2); Milgrom and Roberts, 1986(3)) in the decision of agents who subsequently choose whether to transmit the message, which they cannot transform. In our model, there are multiple equilibria, along the lines of cheap talk games. However, as in persuasion games, at the transmission stage agents have an incentive to pass on credible information to other agents. In our model (Bloch/Demange/Kranton), there is a single unknown source of information and agents are Bayesian, but due to differences in their preferences and the possibility of falsification and blocking, they may end up with different beliefs and choose different actions. >Misinformation/Economic Theories, >Communication Models/Kranton. 1. CRAWFORD, V. P., AND J. SOBEL, “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica 50 (6) (1982), 1431–51. 2. MILGROM, P. R., “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,” Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2), (1981), 380–91. 3. MILGROM, P., AND J. ROBERTS, “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,” Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 18–32. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Economic Theories Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
||
> Counter arguments against Economic Theories
> Counter arguments in relation to Communication Models
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28